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During the past year, a number of decisions have been handed down by
Texas courts within the area of the law of wills and trusts. These decisions
include such areas of the law as construction of wills, gifts causa mortis, com-
petence to make 'a will, joint and mutual wills, express and constructive
trusts.
Construction. Perhaps in no other area of the law is the careful use of lan-
guage so vital -as in the drafting of a will. It is a basic rule of construction
that the court will attempt to ascertain the intent of the testator within the
four corners of -the instrument, giving due consideration to each and every
provision. The careful 'and consistent use of words and phrases is most im-
portant.
Stewart v. Selder' concerned the use of the word "cash." The testatrix's
will in nine paragraphs devised specific properties to designated individuals,
including a one-fourth undivided interest to a sister. There was no residuary
clause; however, paragraph two provided: "If there is any cash, after ex-
penses and debts are paid, I leave it to my aunt, Estell Stewart."'2 The testa-
trix owned at the time of 'her death, in addition -to the specific properties
left 'by her will, an undivided one-fourth interest in a homestead, a vacant
lot, and an undivided one-half interest in various stocks and bonds. Cer-
tain heirs-at-law sued for an interest in these assets under the statutes of
descent and distribution. The trial court concluded that the vacant lot,
which was not mentioned in specific bequests and devises, passed to the
heirs-at-law by intestacy, that the one-fourth undivided interest in the home-
stead passed -to a sister along with a specific devise of an additional one-
fourth interest to the same devisee, and that all stocks, bonds, and deposits
readily convertible into cash passed to the aunt, Estell.
The court of civil 'appeals affirmed 3 the 'trial court on the issue of the
disposition of the vacant lot, permitting it to pass by intestacy. As to the
other properties not specifically bequeathed and devised, -the intermediate
court reversed the trial court and awarded -these to the plaintiff heirs-at-law.
This judgment the supreme court affirmed. Although the testatrix had little
contact with the heirs-at-law, the supreme court held that there was no way
that it could rewrite her will and redirect 'her properties. Accordingly, the
vacant lot, the one-fourth interest in the homestead, and non-cash items
* B.S.C., Southern Methodist University; M.B.A., J.D., Northwestern University;
S.J.D., Harvard University. Dean and Professor of Law, Southern Methodist Univer-
sity.
1. 473 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. 1971).
2. Id. at 5.
3. 461 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970).
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passed by intestacy. The term "cash" passing under paragraph two meant
actual cash, less debts -and expenses, but not estate taxes; it did not include
assets which were readily convertible into cash.
Stewart v. Selder is a good illustration of a situation in which, had the
testatrix foreseen all the consequences, she would undoubtedly have disposed
of all of her possessions. As the court pointed out, she may have thought
that the residue of her estate would be consumed in paying debts and ex-
penses, whereas, in fact, there was a substantial residue left over.
Pickering v. Miles4 involved the oft-encountered problem of determining
whether an estate is contingent, vested, or vested subject to divestment. The
order of events is significant: Robbins made a will in 1952. He died in
1957, survived by an only son, the life beneficiary of an express testamen-
tary trust. The corpus of the trust would vest in the children of Robbins,
Jr. after his death, at such time when -the youngest child reached -the age
of twenty-one. Robbins, Jr. died in 1966, survived by three minor children
who became beneficiaries of the trust until the youngest child reached twen-
ty-one years of age. One of the minor children, Thomas, died in 1969 at
age fifteen, intestate and without issue. Thomas's heirs-at-law included his
mother, his sisters, and two half-brothers by his mother's previous marriage.
The trial court held that when Robbins, Jr. died in 1966 the property vested
in his children subject to the testamentary trust in Robbins, Sr.'s will which
continued until the youngest child reached twenty-one. The court of civil
appeals reversed,5 holding that the property did not vest until the youngest
child reached twenty-one. Thus, the mother and two half-brothers would
share in Thomas's interest under the trial court's ruling and would have no
interest under the ruling of the court of civil appeals.
The supreme court reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the
trial court. The principle of construction is that, if a condition is incorpo-
rated into a gift over, the remainder is contingent; but if the condition is
added after a vested gift is made, the remainder is vested subject to divest-
ment. The critical language of the seventh paragraph of the will of Rob-
bins, Sr. directed that 'the residue of -the estate at Robbins, Jr.'s death "be
delivered to the child or children of the said T.N. Robbins, Jr. that are liv-
ing at his death . . ." with the limitation that the trustee "continue to han-
dle and manage said estate until his youngest child reaches the age of twen-
ty-one .... ,1 The court held that the reading of the whole will required
a construction that at the death of Robbins, Jr. the equitable estate vested
in each of his minor children subject to the legal title in the trustee to man-
age the property until the termination of the trust.
In contrast to Pickering v. Miles is Wilkes v. Wilkes.7  Belle Shumard's
will contained a testamentary trust providing for a life income until
the death of the last survivor of the group, at which time the trust termi-
nated and was to be distributed among the then surviving beneficiaries. In
4. 477 S.W.2d 267 (Tex. 1972).
5. 465 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971).
6. 477 S.W.2d at 270.
7. 488 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. 1972).
[Vol. 28
WILLS AND TRUSTS
particular, the testatrix's will provided that her adopted daughter's share
should pass to the beneficiaries under the daughter's will, or to her lineal
descendants, if any, with reversion to the testatrix's estate if the daughter's
share did not otherwise vest. The testatrix died in 1923. Virginia, the
adopted daughter, died in 1960, leaving one son, Robert. The trust was
still in existence when Robert died in 1969 leaving his wife, Margaret, and
two sons surviving. Robert, in his will, designated his wife as a beneficiary
of his trust interest. The supreme court held that the will looked to a class
of beneficiaries: the original life tenants and their lineal descendants. As
persons were added to or dropped from the class, they acquired no vested
interest other than their participation in the class. Robert and 'his sons were
lineal descendants; his wife, Margaret, however, was not a member of the
class. Until the trust finally terminated, there was no vesting; thus, Robert
could not devise his interest to his wife by will because he had no vested
estate which continued beyond his membership in the class.
Other Construction Cases. In O'Neill v. Alford8 the court determined that
a specific bequest of a number of shares in a particular corporation covered
additional shares that were received by the testatrix as a two-for-one stock
split after she executed the will but before her death. In Mercantile Na-
tional Bank v. National Cancer Research Foundation9 a bequest of $10,000
to the National Cancer Research Foundation was construed to be intended
for the National Cancer Foundation. The latter was a local foundation with
which the testatrix would have been familiar; the former, on the other hand,
was a charity operating principally in New York City and vicinity. In City
of Austin v. Austin National Bank'0 a holographic will appointing the
"Austin National Bank to administer my estate" was construed as appointing
the bank not only as executor but also as trustee of a charitable trust for
the Humane Society. The words "nothing to be sold at house-everything
left to ,be given to Goodwill . . ." meant that Goodwill Industries was en-
titled to what was left of furniture, silver, and household wares after dece-
dent's godchild was given first choice of testatrix's personal property remain-
ing in the house.
In another case, Hamilton v. Austin National Bank, a holographic will
provided that all property passed to the testator's wife, and further, that
after her death, if it were not necessary to dispose of their home, he "would
like our home . . . to be given to the Texas Fine Arts Association for a
small museum."" The words "would like" were construed to be precatory,
not mandatory, so that on the wife's death, the Association acquired nothing
under the will.
In Howard v. Neary'2 a husband's will granted the residue of his estate
to his wife for life with remainder to his daughter. The will further pro-
vided that his wife could sell, convey, mortgage, or encumber the property
8. 485 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972).
9. 488 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972), error. ref. n.r.e.
10. 488 S.W.2d 586 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972), error granted.
11. 487 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
12. 485 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972).
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"as she may see fit" and use the income or proceeds "in such manner as
she shall deem proper," it 'being my intention that she shall have full con-
trol .... "u1 The court held that these words gave the wife full power
of disposition, including the right to use the property in a purely personal
manner.
14
In Betts v. Haggard'8 a son executed his will in 1955 leaving everything
to his mother, and died May 1.9, 1971. The mother executed her will on
June 14, 1971, and died on November 2, 1971. The third paragraph of
the mother's will left the "remainder of my estate then existing after the
foregoing bequests have been complied with . . ." and the fourth paragraph
left all "the rest, residue and remainder of the property which I may own
at the time of my death . . . , including all lapsed legacies and devides[sic]
... "16 Certain beneficiaries under the fourth paragraph contended that
the words "then existing" in the third paragraph referred to the testatrix's
own property as distinguished from the property which she received from
her son and that the fourth paragraph was the only residuary clause. The
court construed the third paragraph as the residuary clause and the fourth
paragraph as a contingent residuary clause to be effective only if bequests
in the prior paragraphs became ineffective.
Bailey v. Price17 concerned the construction of the word "children." In
various places the testator provided for his children. Section XI of his will
provided, "wherever herein my children are referred to, it is my intention
to include not only my children above named, but any other children who
may be born to my wife and me, or adopted by us.""' The testator had
a daughter by a former marriage. Evidence was introduced to show that
testator's relationship to this child was not a normal father-daughter relation-
ship. In consideration of such evidence, the court held that "children"
meant only the children named.
Alamo National Bank v. Hurd concerned the use of the word "royalties."
Testator, an experienced oil man, had left "all . . .royalties, . . . as distin-
guished from ... leases"' 19 to a designated beneficiary. The court con-
strued the bequest of royalties as including overriding royalties and produc-
tion payments.
In Langston v. Hoening20 a widow 'with a life estate and power of dis-
position invested $120,000 in a partnership. The agreement provided that
the amount was to be repaid out of one-fourth of the net profits beginning
sixty days from -the date actual operations began, and on the anniversary
date of the partnership, one-half of the profits "then on hand" would be
13. Id. at 592.
14. In Edds v. Mitchell, 143 Tex. 307, 184 S.W.2d 823 (1945), the supreme court
held that the remainderman could follow the unexpended proceeds of sales by a life
tenant with power of disposition; in hat case, however, the proceeds were still in hand,
whereas in the instant case, the life tenant expended the proceeds in living expenses.
15. 495 S.W.2d 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
16. Id. at 604, 605.
17. 495 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
18. Id. at 380.
19. 485 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972).
20. 494 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973).
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applied to the loan. At her death her heirs contended that the amount was
immediately repayable; the partner contended -that repayment was to be
made only out of partnership profits, of which there had been none. The
court sustained the latter construction.
In Swift v. Fort Worth National Bank21 a direction to pay debts, taxes,
and administration costs out of estate income applied with equal force to
income attributable to individual beneficiaries and that attributable to trust
beneficiaries.
Open Mine Doctrine. In Moore v. Vines22 a husband and wife executed
a joint, but not a contractual, will in August 1959, leaving their properties
to the survivor for life with remainders over to designated parties. In Octo-
ber 1959 the wife died and the joint will was probated. An oil and gas
lease executed by the husband and wife in 1951 on two tracts which re-
spectively were the separate property of the husband and wife expired in
1961 with no production. A new lease was executed by the husband in
1961 on what had been his separate property before his wife's death. At
the same time, the husband leased the property which had formerly been
the wife's separate property, but which was now subject to a life estate in
the husband by virtue of the wife's will. The latter lease raised the question
of the applicability of the "open mine" doctrine. Ordinarily, the life tenant
who dissipates the corpus of an estate is liable to the remainderman for
waste. The "open mine" doctrine has been invoked where wells were pro-
ducing at the time the life estate came into being under a lease executed by
the testator or where producing wells are drilled after the vesting of the life
estate, but under an oil and gas lease in force and effect at the time the
life estate commenced. 23  If the "open mine" doctrine is held applicable,
the life tenant may continue to enjoy the rents and profits from the wells
or mines, even though he only holds a life estate; he is not liable to the
remainderman for waste. In Moore, however, the supreme court held that
the "open mine" doctrine was not applicable to the lease on the former sep-
arate property of the wife because there had been no producing wells ob-
tained during the duration of the lease executed by the testator-wife.
Proceeds of Life Insurance. Brault v. Brigham24 concerned a dispute over
the proceeds of a life insurance policy. A husband took out an insurance
policy on his life, his wife's life, and the lives of his minor children. He
designated 'his wife as beneficiary, and named his mother as secondary bene-
ficiary. The husband, wife, and one minor child were killed in an airplane
accident. The wife's sister took the surviving four minor children into her
home -and was appointed guardian of their persons and estates as well as
administratrix of the estates of their parents. The husband's mother sued
the wife's sister for the proceeds of the insurance policy. The jury found
that the husband's designation of his mother as secondary beneficiary was
21. 486 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972).
22. 474 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. 1972).
23. Youngman v. Shular, 155 Tex. 437, 288 S.W.2d 495 (1956).
24. 493 S.W.2d 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973).
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intended to create a trust relationship for the benefit of his children. Because
the mother sought the proceeds individually and not as trustee, the trial
court regarded her suit as repudiating the trust. The court removed the
mother as trustee and designated the wife's sister as trustee. The court of
civil appeals affirmed.
Gifts Causa Mortis. Yates v. Blake25 involved the question of completeness
of a gift. An elderly aunt had certificates of deposit reissued in the joint
names of herself and her niece and gave them to her niece for safekeeping
to be hers upon the aunt's death. Later, the donor-aunt requested the re-
turn of the certificates 'but died before receiving them. In a suit between
the niece and the executor of the aunt's estate, the executor prevailed, the
court holding that a completed gift had not been made and that the gift
of certificates was revocable at any time to the aunt's death.
Competence To Make a Will. Testamentary capacity and undue influence
were before the court in Reynolds v. Park.26 Sidney Park and Ruth Park
executed a joint will in 1953, ."n which the survivor was to take the estate,
and upon the death of the survivor or in the case of simultaneous deaths,
two daughters were to take a life estate, subject to certain limitations, with
a gift over in fee simple to the grandchildren. Ruth died in 1956, and the
joint will was admitted to probate. Sidney remarried in 1957, and subse-
quently executed a codicil to the 1953 will in which he left the separate
property acquired after the death of his first wife and the community prop-
erty of 'his second marriage to his second wife. On October 17, 1970, Sid-
ney was rushed to the hospital where he remained until his death on No-
vember, 5, 1970. On October 27, 1970, while in the 'hospital, he requested
an attorney to draft a new will dividing his estate between his second wife
and his daughters, and it was this will that was contested by the daughters
who raised the issues of testamentary capacity and undue influence. The
jury found issues favorable to the proponents of the second will, and the
contestant-daughters appealed.
The court of civil appeals affirmed, ruling that the tests of Brown
v. MitchellJ27 and Carr v. Radkey28 were properly applied: a witness may
not testify as to a legal conclusion that the testator was of sound mind but
may testify as to all those elements, such as the business in which he is en-
gaged, the effect of his act in making a will, the nature and extent of his
property, recognition of next of kin and the objects of his bounty, which
make up testamentary capacity and sound mind. Furthermore, the tests of
Rothermel v. Duncan29 were correctly applied to the issue of undue influ-
ence: (1) the existence and exertion of 'an influence; (2) the effective op-
eration of such influence so as to subvert or overpower the mind of the test-
ator at the time of the execution of the testament; and (3) the execution
25. 491 S.W.2d 751 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973).
26. 485 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972).
27. 88 Tex. 350, 31 S.W. 621 (1895).
28. 393 S.W.2d 806 (Tex. 1965).
29. 369 S.W.2d 917 (Tex. 1963).
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of a testament which the maker thereof would not have executed but for
such influence.30
Joint and Mutual Wills. The question of whether identical wills are con-
tractual in nature continues to come before the courts. In Magids v. Amer-
ican Title Insurance Co.31 Charles -and his wife Fannie executed identical
wills devising to each other a life estate in all property "of which I die pos-
sessed" with the remainder to their three children. The identical wills were
executed in February 1964, and Fannie died in June 1964. After his wife's
death, Charles discovered that his son, Barnett, was claiming an interest in
certain "Glendale" property and other interests under deeds to himself which
bore the forged signatures of his mother and father. Barnett had mortgaged
the property to Houston First Savings Association which had insured the title
with American Title Insurance Company. Upon discovery of the forgeries,
Charles executed a new will revoking his previous will and sued to remove
the clouds cast on the title to properties. American Title cross-claimed to
foreclose its lien. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Charles
for one-half interest in the fee and a life interest in his wife's one-half in-
terest in the properties. As to American Title, the trial court held that the
son, Barnett, being one of three children, had a one-third interest in his
mother's one-half of the properties, or a one-sixth interest. Such interest
was defeasible, but its vesting depended on Barnett's surviving his father.
This one-sixth defeasible interest was subject to a lien in favor of American
Title.
American Title appealed, contending that it had a lien on both one-sixth
interests: the interest Barnett received from his mother and the interest he
would receive from his father. The title company's contentions were that
the wills of Charles and Fannie were contractual in nature, and that when
Fannie died, Charles was bound by the contract. Thus, under the purported
contract, Charles's own one-half interest in the community property vested
in the remainderman subject to his own life estate. Under this theory the
son, Barnett, had a remainder in a one-third interest subject to foreclosure.
The issue presented, therefore, was the question of whether or not the wills
were contractual.
The trial court refused to find that the identical wills were contractual.
The court of civil appeals reversed and remanded.32 The supreme court
reversed the court of civil appeals and affirmed the trial court. It held that
the burden of proof was on American Title to prove that the wills were con-
tractual, rather than on Charles to prove they were not. From the evidence,
the supreme court could find an agreement to execute identical wills but
30. Findings regarding allegations that the testator lacked testamentary capacity
were approved in Bailey v. Rains, 485 S.W.2d 837 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972), error
ref. n.r.e. See also Phillips v. Christian Science Church, 498 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1973), error ref. n.r.e. (certiorari jurisdiction of district court
properly invoked on issue of testamentary capacity); Dulak v. Dulak, 496 S.W.2d 776
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973); Grohn v. Marquardt, 487 S.W.2d 214 (Tex. Civ. App.
-San Antonio 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
31. 473 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. 1971).
32. 459 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1970).
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no agreement to make the wills contractual. Each will clearly dealt with
the spouse's own property and did not purport to deal with the other's. If
wills are intended to be contractual, the draftsman is well advised to reflect
the intention to contract in clear and precise language.
In contrast to the Magids case is Danner v. McMahan,33 in which a hus-
band and wife without issue executed a joint will which the parties agreed
was contractual. In accordance with the wills each left a life estate to the
other with power of disposition and with the provision that at the death of
the survivor, "any of such estate then remaining" should pass half to desig-
nated heirs of the husband and half to designated heirs of the wife. Each
named the other as independent executor or executrix. The husband died
and the joint will was probated. Subsequently, the wife remarried, then ex-
ecuted another will specifying that it did not revoke the earlier joint will.
At her death, her second husband became independent executor of her es-
tate. A suit ensued between the successor administratrix of the first
husband's estate and the independent executor of the wife's estate. The
court held that at the death of the husband, the beneficiaries under the joint
will were vested with remainders in the estate subject to the life estate in
the wife. At the wife's death, her executor had the responsibility of admin-
istering and distributing the interests established under the joint will and the
properties acquired by the wife subsequent to the death of the first husband
which were the subject of disposition under the second will. Thus, in ef-
fect, an earlier joint will and a later second will were applicable to the wife's
estate.
In Dalton v. Pruett34 a joint, mutual, and contractual will provided for
a life estate in the surviving spouse with remainders over to two designated
beneficiaries. Between the (late of death of the father and that of
the mother, one of the son beneficiaries died leaving all his property to his
wife. The court held that on the death of the father, the remainders vested
in the beneficiaries subject only to the life estate in the mother. Therefore,
when one of the sons died, his vested interest passed to his wife subject only
to the life estate of the mother.
Community or Separate Property. In McKinley v. McKinley"5 the supreme
court had before it the question of the community or separate character of
two savings certificates with a savings and loan association. In the case of
one of the certificates, the court determined that the husband's separate
property owned before marriage could be traced to it; in the case of the
other certificate, the evidence of additions and withdrawals was inconclusive
so that the statutory presumption of community character was not overcome.
II. TRUSTS
Express trusts are subject to the Texas Trust Act; constructive trusts, on
the other hand, arise by operation of equity in cases in which there has been
fraud or overreaching.
33. 490 S.W.2d 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), error ref. n.r.e.
34. 483 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1972).
35. 496 S.W.2d 540 (Tex. 1973).
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Express Trusts. In Lokey v. Texas Methodist Foundation86 a Methodist
minister created a trust for the primary purpose of strengthening the min-
istry of the Methodist Church among people of Mexican, South American,
or Central American backgrounds. Lokey sought to remove the foundation
as trustee and to have the funds transferred to a special trust account at
Southwestern University. The National Division of the Board of Missions
intervened, contending that Lokey was in their employ and that he was not
authorized to raise funds to create an independent foundation. The trial
court and court of civil 'appeals3 7 held that Lokey had no standing to sue
and that the foundation held the funds for the benefit of the National Divi-
sion of the Board of Missions. The supreme court reversed and remanded.
Citing article 7425b-39,38 the court held that Lokey was a person "actually
interested" in the trust and was entitled to his day in court.
Westerfeld v. Huckaby39 involved the doctrine of illusory trusts. In 1966
Virginia, a feme sole, executed two declarations of trust and quitclaimed to
herself as trustee certain real property. The trusts provided that the prop-
erties in trust were for the use and benefit of Huckaby and that upon the
settlor's death, the successor trustee was to deliver the properties outright
to Huckaby. Huckaby was named successor trustee. Virginia reserved to
herself the power to mortgage the properties, collect the income therefrom,
and in her sole discretion, to accumulate the income or pay it to herself.
She reserved the power to revoke at any time; a sale of the property was
to constitute a revocation. The death of the beneficiary revoked the des-
ignation of him as beneficiary, and the settlor reserved the right to designate
a new beneficiary; otherwise, the properties 'in trust reverted to her estate.
By a five-four decision, the court sustained the validity of the trust. In
Land v. Marshall40 the court had held that a husband who transferred com-
munity property to a revocable trust had created an illusory trust and the
trust was, therefore, invalid. The majority distinguished that case and the
instant case, however, on -the grounds that in Land the wife did not consent
to the use of her property and, thus, the invalidation of the husband's trans-
fer of the wife's half of the properties so frustrated the settlor's 'plans that
the entire trust scheme was aborted.
Ford v. Ford4' involved a reformation of an irrevocable trust which the
settlors intended should conform to the Internal Revenue Code provisions
dealing with so called "Clifford trusts."'42 The settlors intended the trusts
to last in excess of ten years, but inadvertently provided for a termination
when the beneficiary reached twenty-one years of age, which would be less
36. 479 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1972).
37. 468 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971).
38. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7425b-39 (1960).
39. 474 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. 1971).
40. 426 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1968).
41. 492 S.W.2d 376 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973), error ref. n.r.e. See also
Comer v. El Paso Nat'l Bank, 498 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973) (in-
competent's attempt to revoke trust enjoined); Austin Lake Estates Recreation Club,
Inc. v. Gilliam, 493 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1973), error ref. n.r.e. (trust
did not fail for lack of cash consideration).
42. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 673.
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than ten years from the trust',s inception. On a clear showing of the inten-
tion of the settlors and the error in drafting, the court approved the reforma-
tion of the instrument.
In another case the court held that a beneficiary's action against a trustee
and fidelity bondsman was properly transferred to Travis County where
bond was filed.43 And in an action against several trustees, venue lay not
in the county of the trust's principal office but in the county of residence
of a principal defendant. 44
Constructive Trust. A sister whose husband suffered a stroke relied on her
brother for advice and management of her estate. The jury found that the
brother was acting in a fiduciary capacity and was a constructive trustee for
his sister. She was entitled to an accounting and interest of sums taken by
her brother and used for his own benefit.45
43. Morse v. Fisher, 493 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1973).
44. McCormick v. Hines, 498 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973), error
dismissed.
45. Oak Cliff Bank & Trust Co. v. Steenbergen, 497 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Waco 1973), error ref. n.r.e. See also Batten v. Batten, 497 S.W.2d 394 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e.; Grunwald v. Grunwald, 487 S.W.2d
240 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1972), error ref. n.r.e.; Woodson v. Tyra,
486 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972).
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